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Abstract
In this paper we provide quantitative insights into the economic
impact of Brexit on European countries and regions. More specif-
ically, we evaluate the impact of a soft and a hard Brexit on pro-
ductivity, markups, product variety, welfare and the distribution of
population across European countries and regions. We employ a
model characterized by costly trade, love of variety, heterogeneous
firms, labour mobility as well as endogenous markups and produc-
tivity. We quantify the model using goods and services trade data
as well as GDP and population for EEA countries/regions plus BRIC
countries and other OECD countries. We finally compute, starting
from the observed initial situation in the year 2016, counterfactual
economic changes stemming from changes in trade costs related to
the implementation of both a soft and a hard Brexit. We find that
Brexit would have a significant impact on the UK and EU economies.
A hard Brexit could lead to annual welfare losses of 57 billion euros
in the UK and about 40 billion euros in other EU countries. A soft
Brexit would strongly mitigate these losses. Productivity losses and
markup increases drive the simulated effects.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we provide quantitative insights into the economic impact of Brexit
for European countries and regions. More specifically, we evaluate the impacts of
Brexit (both a soft and a hard version) on productivity, markups, product variety,
welfare and the distribution of population across European countries and regions.
In order to achieve this, we employ a model characterized by costly trade, love
of variety, heterogeneous firms, labour mobility as well as endogenous markups
and productivity. We subsequently quantify the model using goods and services
trade data as well as GDP and population data for European Economic Area (EEA)
countries/regions plus BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and other
OECD countries. We finally compute, starting from the observed initial situation
in the year 2016, counterfactual economic changes stemming from changes in trade
costs related to the implementation of Brexit.
We first develop a model, drawing upon Behrens et al. (2014) and Behrens et al.
(2017), characterized by costly trade, love of variety, heterogeneous firms, labour
mobility as well as endogenous markups and productivity. We subsequently quan-
tify the model using goods and services trade data as well as GDP and population
for EEA regions/countries plus other OECD and BRIC countries.1 In the first part of
our analysis we quantify our model and run counterfactual analyses at the country-
level for both EEA and non-EEA countries. In the second part of our analysis, we
break down EEA countries into the corresponding NUTS2 regions. We finally assess
the impact of Brexit (both a soft and a hard version) by performing a series of coun-
terfactual experiments. We model the impact of Brexit based on the estimation of a
trade gravity equation from which we recover a parameter measuring the amount
of additional trade EEA countries do with each other once discounted for other de-
terminants of bilateral trade flows (distance, language, adjacency, past colonial ties).
Such a parameter is an indicator of the trade-boosting effects of the EEA agreement
and the Single Market and is the key to our counterfactual Brexit analysis. In the
hard Brexit scenario we set this parameter to zero for trade between the UK and
other members of the EEA and compute the new counterfactual equilibrium. In the
soft Brexit scenario we instead set this parameter to half of the estimated value and
compute the new counterfactual equilibrium. In what follows costs are expressed
1Specifically, these are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
New Zealand, Russia, Turkey and the US.
4
on a yearly basis and so, if one wants to translate such yearly costs into a one-off
cost, a proper time-discounting procedure needs to be applied.
As far as the hard Brexit scenario is concerned we find, unsurprisingly, that the
country that would lose out the most is the UK. Welfare would go down by 2.39%
which translates into 873 euros per capita and an aggregate cost – computed as cost
per capita times population – of more than 57 billion euros. In this respect it is
important to keep in mind that these are yearly costs because the welfare of the
UK will be 2.39% lower than what it would have been in any year following a hard
Brexit. Therefore, the one-off cost equivalent to a hard Brexit would be considerably
higher than the 2.39% figure for welfare, 873 euros per capita and 57 billion euros in
aggregate. The same applies to costs and gains for other countries.
Coming back to our results, the decline of UK welfare will materialize as a conse-
quence of a reduction in productivity (and product variety) of 2.20% and an increase
in markups of 2.25%. The simulations suggest that this would cause more than
750,000 people to leave the UK for better prospects elsewhere. At the same time,
however, all EEA countries will be negatively affected by Brexit. Some countries
close to the UK, like Ireland, would lose considerably (1.24% reduction in welfare
meaning more than 700 euros per capita) while some other countries far away from
the UK, like Austria, would only be marginally affected (0.20% reduction in welfare
meaning about 80 euros per capita). The aggregate cost, computed as per capita cost
times population, of Brexit for EEA countries (not including the UK) would sum up
to 43 billion euros. Again, these figures are on a yearly basis and so the one-off
equivalent cost would be much higher. Finally, countries outside the EEA are ac-
tually expected to experience some small gains from Brexit. For example, the US
would experience a 0.08% increase in welfare corresponding to 41 euros per capita
and summing up to a total of 13.2 billion euros.
Moving from countries to regions unveils rich and very heterogenous patterns.
Such patterns are actually quite straightforward to interpret as the size of changes
being largely dictated by distance to the UK: Regions closer (further away) to (from)
the UK experiencing larger (smaller) relative changes. At the same time, analyz-
ing the data in more detail using a linear regression also reveals that smaller and
more productive regions lose more than larger and less productive ones. As far as
UK regions are concerned, welfare losses would be larger for regions closer to the
continent like East Anglia (2.54% loss), Kent (2.53% loss), Essex (2.48% loss) and
Cornwall (2.48% loss). Interestingly enough, London would be among the regions
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loosing the least in percentage terms (1.66% loss) but the one loosing the most in
absolute terms (about 1,700 euros per capita) owing to its large GDP per capita.
As far as the soft Brexit scenario is concerned, the effects are similar to those of
the hard Brexit scenario, but lower in magnitude. Welfare would go down in the
UK by 1.34%, equivalent to 491 euros per capita. The aggregate cost for the UK
would be more than 32 billion euros. This will materialize as a consequence of a
reduction in productivity and product variety of 1.24% and in increase in markups
of 1.26%. In a soft Brexit scenario, this would cause more than 400,000 people to
leave the UK. Once again, all EEA countries will be negatively affected by Brexit. As
outlined above, countries close to the UK would lose considerably (e.g., Ireland with
a 0.68% reduction in welfare meaning almost 400 euros per capita) while some other
countries further away from the UK, like Greece, would only be marginally affected
(0.1% reduction in welfare meaning about 20 euros per capita). The aggregate cost of
a soft Brexit for EEA countries (not including the UK) would sum up to 23.8 billion
euros. Again, countries outside the EEA could benefit to a small extent from Brexit.
For example, the US would experience a 0.04% increase in welfare corresponding to
22 euros per capita and summing up to a total of 7.3 billion euros.
The regional effects of a soft Brexit resemble the patterns we observe in the hard
Brexit scenario: the magnitude of losses are decreasing in the distance from the UK.
Again, smaller and more productive EU regions lose out more relative to larger and
less productive ones. Moreover, London would be one of the regions in which the
relative welfare loss is among the lowest (a 0.94% loss), but the loss in absolute terms
would be among the highest (about 960 euros per capita), reflecting its high GDP
per capita.
The building blocks of our analysis are the models developed in Behrens et al.
(2014) and Behrens et al. (2017). Many general equilibrium models of international
trade yield equivalent results about the aggregate impacts of trade liberalization
for welfare and trade flows as captured by the gravity equation (Arkolakis et al.,
2012). However, models differ in their specific predictions along which margins
an economy adjusts to freer trade. Recent workhorse frameworks have focused
on combinations of wages, productivity, and consumption diversity as adjustment
mechanisms, triggered by firm selection and market share reallocations. Yet, those
models do not come to grips with the fact that trade integration also changes firms’
price-cost margins.
In this respect there has been vastly growing empirical interest in markups re-
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cently, and important contributions by De Loecker (2011), De Loecker et al. (2016),
Feenstra and Weinstein (2017), Simonovska (2015), and others, have established
some basic facts: (i) markups differ substantially across firms even within industries,
and firms with lower marginal costs tend to charge higher markups; (ii) firms apply
different markups across different markets; and (iii) trade integration affects price-
cost margins. The main contribution of Behrens et al. (2014) is to develop a general
equilibrium quantifiable model of trade under monopolistic competition with vari-
able demand elasticity, heterogeneous firms, and multiple asymmetric countries.
Wages, productivity, and consumption diversity are all endogenously determined,
and in line with the facts (i)–(iii), markups differ across firms and across markets,
and respond to trade integration. We use this model in our analysis and further
allow for mobility of workers across space along the lines of Behrens et al. (2017).
Finally, we use the concept of equivalent variation to measure changes in welfare
drawing upon the results laid down in Arkolakis et al. (2018).
2 Method and approach
In this section, we provide a non-technical outline of the model used for the analyses
throughout this study.2 To estimate the effect of Brexit on EU countries’ and regions’
productivity, markups, welfare and population we use a modern quantitative trade
model of the global economy based on Behrens et al. (2014) and Behrens et al. (2017).
Quantitative trade models incorporate the channels through which trade affects con-
sumers, firms and workers, and provide a mapping from trade data to welfare. The
model provides numbers for how much countries and regions are affected by differ-
ent trade policies, using readily available data on trade volumes, GDP and potential
trade barriers. The trade data we use are from the COMTRADE (ITS) database pro-
vided by the United Nations (Eurostat) for the period 2010-2016. We also consider
data from a set of relevant factors to be used in our gravity regression, provided
by the Centre d’Etude Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). Using
data on trade costs and based on a gravity regression, we derive a measure of "free-
ness of trade" that mirrors the trade boosting effect of the Single Market. For the
analysis here, we derive a counterfactual freeness of trade-parameter that reflects,
all else equal, the weakened projected trade between the UK and other countries in
2The full derivation and all technical details of the model are available on request.
7
the Single Market as a result of Brexit. In the soft Brexit scenario, the trade boosting
effect of the Single Market for trade with the UK would be reduced (but still be
existent). In the hard Brexit scenario, the trade boosting effect of the Single Market
would be set to zero.
The model used in our analysis builds upon the tradition of so-called "gravity
models of trade", i.e., models where a key feature of trade is that its volume is in-
creasing in the size of the exporting and importing countries/regions and inversely
related to the distance and trade costs between the two countries/regions. In this re-
spect, abundant research and empirical evidence have demonstrated the robustness
and accuracy of these models that represent nowadays a standard in international
trade. These models are also very versatile and modern versions like ours incorpo-
rate several channels via which trade effects the economy.
For example, our model features countries/regions that are more or less com-
petitive depending on the productivity of their firms and/or the cost of their labour
force as well as consumers buying differentiated varieties of products and services
produced anywhere in the world. It also allows for firms in each country/region
to be heterogeneous in their productivity and size and to be differentially affected
by trade exposure while at the same time incorporating the impacts of trade on
the degree of competition among firms and so ultimately on markups and prices.
Finally, it allows for entry and exit of firms to affect and be affected by trade and
for country size to be a determinant of trade patterns. Countries and regions in
our model trade with each other and trade is subject to trade costs. Any change in
trade barriers affect all countries/regions in a general equilibrium fashion via the
above channels and our model pins down these interdependencies and quantifies
the impacts of change in trade barriers on key economic outcomes: productivity,
markups, welfare and population. Our analysis of welfare changes is based on the
concept of equivalent variation as in Arkolakis et al. (2018). More specifically, we
compute the change in income that, given initial prices, would allow the represen-
tative consumer to reach the same utility level corresponding to the counterfactual
equilibrium. Loosely speaking, this corresponds to the income reduction/increase
equivalent of the counterfactual Brexit scenario.
However, despite being rich and versatile our model, like any modern quanti-
tative trade model, is based upon assumptions that limit its capacity to be able to
speak about other important aspects. For example, our model has nothing to say
about how countries’/regions’ trade balances would be affected by Brexit because
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we assume that trade is balanced. At the same time, our model does not feature
growth and so the impact of trade on the speed of innovation is not accounted for.
In the same vein, the positive effects that European integration has on "soft" de-
terminants of integration (i.e., culture, education and national security, to name a
few) are not part of our analysis either. Finally, our model also abstracts from the
distribution of welfare gains and losses due to changes in trade costs. Indeed, our
model provides insights into overall gains and losses at the country/region level but
has nothing to say about who will be positively and/or negatively affected within a
country/region.
3 The economic costs of a hard Brexit
3.1 Results
In our Brexit analysis, we present two series of results. First, we work at the country
level and, contrary to models used in most previous analyses, we allow for mobility
of labor across countries. Second, we work at the regional level, and allow for labor
mobility across both countries and regions. We also take a more detailed look at
two countries, the UK and Germany, to uncover more heterogeneity in regional
welfare effects. Note that the counterfactual simulations for countries and regions
are separate simulations – that is, the country simulations treat EEA countries as
country units, while the region-wide quantification treats the same set of countries
as a collection of their respective regions.3
3.1.1 Countries
Table 1 summarizes our key results on economic outcomes at the country level.4
It reveals, unsurprisingly, that the country that would lose the most in our hard
Brexit scenario is the UK. Welfare would go down by 2.39% which means 873 euros
per capita and an aggregate cost, computed as cost per capita times population, of
more than 57 billion euros. In this respect it is important to note that these are
3Thus, the estimated economic impact for the same country can slightly differ across the simu-
lations. Whenever we refer to losses at the country level, we refer to the country-wide simulations.
When we refer to regional losses, we base our analysis on the region-wide simulations.
4Note that within our model, percentage changes in productivity and consumption diversity will
be the same.
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yearly costs because the welfare of the UK will be 2.39% lower that what it would
have been in any year following a hard Brexit. Therefore, the one-off cost equivalent
to a hard Brexit would be considerably higher than the 2.39% loss of welfare, 873
euros per capita and 57 billion euros in aggregate. The same applies to costs and
gains for other countries.
The decline of UK welfare will materialize as a consequence of a reduction in
productivity and product variety of 2.20% and in increase in markups of 2.25%.
Furthermore, this would cause more than 750,000 people to leave the UK for better
prospects elsewhere. At the same time, however, all EEA countries will be negatively
affected by Brexit. Some countries close to the UK, like Ireland, would lose consid-
erably (1.24% reduction in welfare meaning more than 700 euros per capita) while
some other countries far away from the UK, like Austria, would only be marginally
affected (0.20% reduction in welfare meaning about 80 euros per capita). The aggre-
gate cost, computed as per capita cost times population, of Brexit for EEA countries
(not including the UK) would sum up to 43 billion euros. Again, these figures are on
a yearly basis and so the one-off equivalent cost would be much higher. Countries
outside the EEA are actually expected to experience some small gains from Brexit.
For example, the US would experience a 0.08% increase in welfare corresponding to
41 euros per capita and summing up to a total of 13.2 billion euros.
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3.1.2 Regions
While Table 1 shows our key results at the country level, it also masks a substantial
amount of within-country heterogeneity. We now present results for our counterfac-
tual scenario by breaking down EEA countries into their NUTS2 regions. Together
with the rest-of-the-world countries we hence run the model for 297 regions in total
(283 NUTS2 regions, and 14 other OECD and BRIC trading partners).
Figure 1 displays relative welfare losses (in %) across NUTS2 regions as a result
of a hard Brexit scenario. Such figures highlight the richness of detail and hetero-
geneity that our analysis can capture. The patterns in Figure 1 can be interpreted as
the size of relative changes being largely determined by distance to the UK: Again,
regions closer to the UK would see larger changes as a result of a hard Brexit. At the
same time, analyzing the data further by means of a linear regression also reveals
that smaller and more productive regions lose more than larger and less productive
ones. Importantly, note that such welfare losses reflect the size of the losses relative
to the GDP levels across region – the darker the shading, the higher the relative
income loss due to a hard Brexit. However, in terms of absolute welfare losses, the
picture looks quite differently and much more scattered than in Figure 1. We further
highlight the differences between absolute and relative welfare losses below, as we
examine regional heterogeneity within individual countries.
As far as UK regions are concerned relative welfare losses – as displayed in detail
in the left panel of Figure 2 – would be larger for regions closer to the continent like
East Anglia (2.54% loss), Kent (2.53% loss), Essex (2.48% loss) and Cornwall (2.48%
loss). London would be among the regions loosing the least in % terms (1.66% loss)
but the one loosing the most in absolute terms (about 1,700 euros per capita) owing
to its large GDP per capita. Table 3 (in the appendix) provides detailed information
on hard Brexit effects for all regions. Looking at aggregate absolute losses by region
(right panel of Figure 2), on the other hand, reveals more insights. Again, London is
a case in point: given its high population, the incidence of aggregate welfare losses
(by region and not per capita) suggests that London would lose out the most – with
central London alone incurring a welfare loss of more than 5.5 billion euros annually.
However, relative income losses are quite low given the city’s high GDP level. There
are also regions in which relative welfare losses are high, but the aggregate regional
loss appears to be fairly low. For instance, in Devon the percentage loss in welfare
is relatively high (2.43%), as is the corresponding per capita welfare loss (about 700
12
euros). However, due to its moderate population size, aggregate income losses are
relatively low, at less than 800 million euros.
As another exemplary country, we now turn to regional welfare effects in Ger-
many. The left panel in Figure 3 displays relative welfare losses (in %) across Ger-
many. The right panel depicts simulated absolute welfare losses by German region.
As can be seen, regions in which major cities are located, such as Cologne, Dussel-
dorf and Hamburg would be hit quite strongly by a hard Brexit, both in absolute
terms (aggregate welfare losses across its population) and in terms of relative wel-
fare losses. Moreover, it can be noted that regions closer to the UK tend to suffer
the most in relative terms – for example, the Weser-Ems region and the region of
Schleswig-Holstein lose out the most in relative terms (about 0.3%). Strikingly, eco-
nomically particularly strong regions like Oberbayern (which includes the city of
Munich) show just a moderate level of relative income losses, owing to the region’s
high initial GDP level. But the region indicates a per capita welfare loss of 115 euros
annually (among the top 20% regions). And given its strong population, the region’s
overall welfare losses in absolute terms come third in Germany at more than half a
billion euros per year.
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4 The economic costs of a soft Brexit
4.1 Results
Akin to the hard Brexit scenario, we again present two sets of analyses, separately
for countries and regions while allowing for mobility of labor across countries. We
also take a more detailed view on regions in the UK and Germany – however, soft
and hard brexit scenarios mainly differ in the magnitude of the costs incurred by
countries and regions; the relative strengths in the costs across regions are broadly
unaffected.
4.1.1 Countries
We start with a view at country level effects. Table 2 summarizes our key results at
the country level. As in the hard Brexit scenario, Table 2 indicates that the country
losing out the most in the soft Brexit scenario is, again, the UK. Welfare would go
down by 1.34% which implies a loss of 491 euros per capita. The aggregate cost for
the UK would be more than 32 billion euros. Again, the reduction in welfare would
be accompanied by a loss in productivity of 1.24% and an increase in markups of
1.26%. According to the simulations, the soft Brexit scenario would cause more than
400,000 people to leave the UK for better prospects elsewhere. As for other countries,
we observe patterns that resemble the soft Brexit scenario: all EEA countries will be
affected. Being close to the UK, Ireland would be hit relatively hard (0.68% reduction
in welfare implying almost 400 euros per capita) while some other countries far
away from the UK, like Austria, would only be marginally affected in relative terms
(0.11% reduction in welfare meaning about 45 euros per capita). We note that the
aggregate cost of a soft Brexit for EEA countries (not including the UK) would sum
up to 23.8 billion euros.
Akin to our findings from analyzing the hard Brexit scenario, countries outside
the EEA are expected to experience some small gains from a soft Brexit. For ex-
ample, the US would experience a 0.04% increase in welfare corresponding to 22.5
euros per capita and summing up to a total of 7.3 billion euros.
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4.1.2 Regions
As in the previous section, we now present results for our counterfactual scenario
by breaking down EEA countries into their NUTS2 regions and now examine the
likely impact of a soft Brexit on regional welfare. Figure 4 presents relative welfare
losses (in % of regional incomes) across NUTS2 regions. Again, this figure uncovers
the regional (within-country) heterogeneity in terms of relative welfare losses. The
patterns we observe are broadly similar to those of the hard Brexit scenario, yet the
magnitude of the shock would be smaller. Consequently, Figure 4 can be interpreted
such that the size of changes are largely determined by distance to the UK with
regions closer (further away) to (from) the UK experiencing larger (smaller) changes.
Using multivariate regression, we reveal that smaller and more productive regions
lose more than larger and less productive ones as a result of the soft Brexit scenario.
To examine within-country heterogeneity in more detail, we now turn to individ-
ual countries and analyse the effects of Brexit for regions in the UK and Germany.
Note that Table 4 (in the appendix) lists soft Brexit effects for all regions in our data.
The left and right panels of Figure 5 present relative and absolute welfare losses
across UK regions, respectively. As for relative welfare losses, we observe that these
would be larger for regions closer to the continent like East Anglia (1.42% loss), Kent
(1.42% loss), Essex (1.40% loss) and Cornwall (1.38% loss). As in the hard Brexit case,
we observe a slightly altered pattern when looking at absolute welfare losses. For
instance, we document that London would be among the regions losing the least
in percentage terms (0.94% loss) from a soft Brexit, but the one losing the most in
absolute terms (about 3.5 billion euros) owing to its large GDP per capita. This,
yet again, highlights the importance to distinguish between relative and absolute
changes across regions due to Brexit.
In Figure 6, we present the effects of a soft Brexit on welfare in German regions.
The relative impact would resemble the patterns we observe in the hard Brexit sce-
nario; yet, the magnitudes of the effects would be lower. Aggregate welfare losses
would be highest in Oberbayern, Dusseldorf und Cologne, ranging from 300 to
350 million euros annually. Relative to current income levels, the impact would be
strongest in regions in the north of the country: Hamburg, Bremen and the Weser-
Ems regions would lose out the most, with about 0.17% of welfare losses. Strikingly,
this percentage loss also corresponds to what Dusseldorf and Cologne would forego
– which are thus regions that lose out strongly both in relative and in absolute terms.
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5 Conclusion
This paper estimates conceivable economic costs of Brexit. Its main focus is on how
the trade shock of Brexit affects citizens’ welfare, with the analysis also documenting
the effects at the regional (NUTS2) level within countries. The estimation is based
on counterfactual simulations of increasing trade costs as a result of a hard and a
soft Brexit scenario, respectively. These simulations are making use of a quantitative
(general equilibrium) trade model which builds upon modern gravity models of
trade – that is, trade is characterized by its volume increasing in the size of the
exporting and importing countries/regions and inversely related to the distance
and trade costs between countries/regions.
The analysis primarily shows that Brexit – hard or soft – is likely to have a
significant, yet regionally varying, impact on welfare. We find that, unsurprisingly,
the UK would lose out the most from Brexit. The aggregate welfare losses of a hard
Brexit would amount to 57 billion euros annually, which translates into an average
yearly loss of 873 euros per capita. In a soft Brexit scenario, the aggregate welfare
loss would amount to 32 billion euros for the UK, with a per capita welfare loss of
about 500 euros.
As for other countries, the relative welfare losses are stronger the nearer a coun-
try is to the UK. Ireland, for instance, would be projected to lose about 720 euros of
income (per capita) in a hard Brexit and about 400 euros in a soft Brexit scenario,
both annually. In absolute aggregate terms, welfare losses are also severe elsewhere:
Germany would incur welfare losses of about 10 billion euros annually and France
would see a loss of about 8 billion euros. Given these countries’ relatively high
population figures, the per capita losses for both countries would be in the range of
115-120 euros per year.
A key feature of our analysis is a look at the regional level. Again, closeness to
the UK and regional trade volumes are key to the projected welfare losses based on
our model. However, there is considerable regional heterogeneity in the impact of
Brexit. For instance, in a hard Brexit scenario relative welfare losses in the UK can be
as high as 2.5% percent in East Anglia, while London – due to its high GDP – would
incur just about half of the percentage loss. However, cities like London would see
a strong absolute welfare loss, of more than 5 billion euros annually. At the same
time, regions like Lincolnshire would only lose about 450 million euros annually.
As for German regions, absolute losses due to a hard Brexit also vary signif-
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icantly across the country. Regions with high economic activity like Oberbayern,
Dusseldorf and Cologne are likely to incur the highest welfare losses, with about
500-650 million euros of welfare losses each. However, in terms of relative welfare
losses, southern Germany is affected to a lesser degree given its somewhat lower
dependence on trade with the UK. Northern parts of the country like Schleswig-
Holstein and Bremen are among the regions that would suffer the strongest relative
welfare losses, amounting to more than 0.3%. These patterns also hold for a soft
Brexit scenario, but the losses are lower in magnitude.
The economic costs of Brexit documented in this study mainly play out through
losses in productivity and increased markups. That is, Brexit – hard or soft – is likely
to affect key sources of growth as well as competition, thereby exerting negative
costs on economies in Europe. Moreover, the analysis suggests that smaller, more
productive regions tend to lose out the most as a result of Brexit. Partly, these
regions might be less capable of easily shifting trade (and economic activity more
generally) to other countries and regions. This particular consequence demonstrates
that Brexit notably dampens growth potential not just in the UK but across the EU.
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